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Abstract The concept of modern constitutionalism is intimately related to notions of state 
sovereignty. The actual influence of the constitution as a hierarchical tool of nation-state design 
remains a matter of dubious empirical validity. Today, among the conditions of intergovern-
mentalism and globalization, state centered constitutionalism is confronting governance by 
networks: both private domestic networks and networks of national governmental institutions 
are becoming decision-makers, which cannot be controlled within the concepts of state based 
constitutionalism. Notwithstanding these developments the above difficulties of constitutional 
social steering and determination of the public sphere have not resulted in the dethroning of 
the paradigm of state centered constitutional law in the constitutional law community. Such 
disregard runs the risk to turn constitutionalism into irrelevant speculation in an age of 
globalization. In the globalized world the most important decisions and events affecting society 
escape the control of the sovereign state operating on the principle of territoriality. In this paper 
I consider two structures of polycentric exercise of public power that are decisive for a new 
paradigm of constitutionalism. The first type of transnational network structure is primarily a 
network of private ordering with the participation of administrative bodies of the desaggregat-
ing state and private entities associated with the administrative entities (transboundary private 
networks). A second kind of transnational networks (transgovernmental networks) originates 
from supranational organizations that operate beyond the nation state. Transgovernmental 
networks take away traditional governmental functions and overwrite/replace the decisions of 
the state organs. The taking of state functions includes regulation, adjudication, enforcement, 
material and other services. The actions of the networks are beyond the control of the constitu-
tionally designated authorities and follow principles, which are unrelated to the otherwise 
pertinent constitutional principles. The article considers the impact of international networks 
on the desaggregation of the constitutional state and the possibility of a new legitimation for 
transnational network-based governance. 
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The concept of modern constitutionalism is intimately related to notions of state 
sovereignty. The constitution is understood as a self-definition of the sovereign 
state: constitutionalism is the self-restriction of the state. In the concept of the 
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state that is based on state sovereignty it is the constitution that shall determine 
the fundamental arrangements regarding the use of public power and the structure 
and organization of fundamental state institutions. Beginning with Hans 
Kelsen, the prevailing hierarchical understanding of the rule of law based state 
conceived the constitution as the fundamental or decisive element of the legal 
order. Today the constitution and constitutionalism–as a practice organized 
around the constitution–is presented in textbooks as the sum total and explicit 
formation and safeguard of the shared values of society, or at least the sum 
total of the values or practices that enable living together in the given state. 
 To what extent these expectations can be met was always a matter of serious 
doubt. The actual influence of the constitution as a hierarchical tool of state 
design remains a matter of empirical validity. One can always contest the 
assumption that the constitution pushes towards constitutionalism the most 
important organizations of the state.  
 The lack of sufficient empirical proof to the centrality of the constitution 
thesis has not endangered the legitimacy and therefore normativity of the 
constitution. Nevertheless, the growing importance of private organizations 
beyond the control of the public power created a serious challenge to the 
traditional perspective of constitutionalism. This challenge is made even more 
serious by transnational activities. Of course, constitutional law tried to extend 
its values to the private sphere in the form of state action and third party effect 
doctrines but most of the private power and transgovernmental phenomena 
remained under the radar of constitutional law.1 This is quite stunning given 
that the dislocation challenges the role of the modern state constitution as “a 
central mechanism which enabled the recognition, coordination, assimilation 
and self-legitimation of the legal and political systems”.2 
 Today, among the conditions of intergovernmentalism and globalization, 
state centered constitutionalism is confronting governance by networks: both 
private domestic networks and networks of national governmental institutions 
are becoming decision-makers, which cannot be controlled within the concepts 
  
 1 See Walker, N.: The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism. Modern Law Review 65 (2002) 
317–359, text accompanying note 89. The challenge to state-centered theories originates in 
the new institutional perception of the European Union. Integration is a “polity creating 
process in which authority and policy-making are shared across multiple levels of govern-
ment–subnational, national and supranational.” See Marks, G. et al.: European Integration 
from the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multiple-Level Governance. Journal of Common Market 
Studies 34 (1996) 341–378, 342. For a review of the debate see Craig, P.: The Community 
Political Order. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 10 (2003) 79–124. 
 2 Chalmers, D.: Post-Nationalism and the Quest for Constitutional Substitutes. Journal 
of Law and Society 27 (2000) 187–217, 179. 
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of state based constitutionalism. Arguably, transnationally networked private 
and governmental organizations become more and more decisive in the 
organization of social life and what used to be called the public sphere. Trans-
governmental networks increasingly take over governmental decision-making. 
In the definition of “transgovernmental networks” I follow Kal Raustiala: “Trans-
governmentality refers to the involvement of specialized domestic officials who 
directly interact with each other, often with minimal supervision by foreign 
ministries: They are ‘networks’ because this cooperation is based on loosely-
structured, peer-to-peer ties developed through frequent interaction rather 
than formal negotiation. Thus defined, the phrase ‘transgovernmental net-
works’ captures a strikingly wide array of contemporary cooperation.”3 Note that 
although networks do have important power elements and do serve interstate 
and other (corporate) domination, the networks operate primarily as epistemic 
communities. This will be crucial in their indifference to constitutional con-
siderations. 
 Even without the recent developments in transgovernmental networking, 
the centrality of constitutional law and its ability to steer social relations 
towards constitutional values has been very stressed. To some extent the limits 
to constitutional steering are built into the very concept of constitutionalism, 
namely in the various precepts and principles protecting private life. Tradi-
tional programs of constitutionalism, like the American one, were restricted 
to the sphere of governmental action. It is also obvious that irrespective the 
aspirations of constitutionalism to shape society and impose its own model of 
fairness and justice, the attempts to create a constitutional society remain 
somewhat futile because of the limited penetration of law into society. 
 In all forms of constitutionalism, irrespective of the assumptions constitu-
tional law makes regarding its power to control other parts of the legal system, 
there is a principal assumption regarding a rather neat separation of the public 
and private spheres. It is the intent of constitutional law to determine the 
boundaries of these two spheres. The point is that the two spheres are subject 
to external normative boundary setting only to a limited extent. On the long 
run the constitutionally carved out divide has to take into consideration the 
social construction of these boundaries (see e.g. the case of abortion that was 
  
 3 Raustiala, K.: The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental 
Networks and the Future of International Law. Virginia Journal of International Law 43 
(2002) 1–92, 5. Consider also Risse-Kappen, T.: Cooperation Among Democracies: The 
European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy. Princeton, 1995. 38. (defining “transgovern-
mental coalitions” as “transboundary networks among subunits of national governments 
forming in the absence of central and authoritative national decisions”). 
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gradually accepted to be a private matter). Moreover, the dynamics of shaping 
the public and private spheres has changed considerably in a world where 
globalizing private networks are increasingly capable to shape what remains in 
the public sphere. In particular, these networks are capable to replace the state 
law with their own system of norms. In many regards transnational governmental 
networks are also able to determine what is “private”, enabling the self-regu-
lation that they have sanctioned to remain beyond the reach of constitutional 
law and constitutionalism. 
 Notwithstanding these developments the above difficulties of constitutional 
social steering and determination of the public sphere have not resulted in the 
dethroning of the paradigm of state centered constitutional law in the constitu-
tional law community. Such disregard runs the risk to turn constitutionalism 
into irrelevant speculation in an age of globalization. In the globalized world 
the most important decisions and events affecting society escape the control of 
the sovereign state operating on the principle of territoriality. Once the state 
looses control, there seems to be no social actor interested to impose values of 
constitutionalism into social ordering.  
 The transnational networks challenge the state’s monopoly over the public 
sphere that is exercised through its administrative machinery. The state looses 
control over the sphere that it assigned to be under its supervision. This means 
that to the extent the state operated according to constitutional values this opera-
tions will cease to be decisive. The basic assumptions of constitutionalism 
embedded into the constitution become of questionable relevance.  
 Constitutional relations of the state were already under stress given the 
internationalization of many domestic relations. Moreover, the internationali-
zation resulted in a change in the balance of powers, with increased powers 
granted to the executive. To a considerable extent the executive escapes the 
control of the other branches in the generation of international norms applicable 
to the state. Many areas of regulation that earlier were at least supervised by 
the legislative and judicial branches, are now presented as activities falling 
within foreign policy, a matter traditionally reserved to a great extent to the 
executive. The transnational networking contributes to a polycentric (non-state 
centered) exercise of public power (including the removal of the exercise of 
power from the public sphere). By polycentricity I mean that the state cannot 
decide alone in matters traditionally reserved to sovereign power, at least the 
decisions are consensual with other states and international organizations, or, 
the decisions emerge without the participation of traditional holders of state 
sovereignty.  
 In this paper I consider two structures of polycentric exercise of public 
power that are decisive for a new paradigm of constitutionalism. The first type 
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of transnational network structure is primarily a network of private ordering 
with the participation of administrative bodies of the desaggregating state and 
private entities associated with the administrative entities (hereinafter trans-
boundary private networks). A second type of transnational networks originates 
from supranational organizations that operate beyond the nation state (like 
the European Union or the WHO; hereinafter transgovernmental networks). 
The participants of the transgovernmental network are components of the 
desaggregated state.  
 The first and primary form of transnational networks is modeled upon 
networks emerging in production and distribution in the corporate world. 
Nokia serves as a good example. Here the economic actors (owned by an 
unidentifiable international network of owners) turned into an international 
network. Other actors are related to the network in more loosely connected 
ways (suppliers, etc.). The identifiable ownership elements that are traditionally 
accessible to national regulators and domestic law more or less disappear or at 
least are too diffuse for successful control. The labor force to be regulated is 
to be found under a jurisdiction (or jurisdictions) that is different from the 
jurisdiction that seems to apply on grounds of ownership or incorporation. 
Management is not only international but also physically hard to locate. As to 
capital, especially when it comes to taxation, this is certainly located “else-
where”, in a hard to reach jurisdiction, or in permanent movement. Private 
networks are often enormous and exercise control over their member organi-
zations, employees and partners in competition with the state. Given that the 
private power remains diffuse and hard to reach for the state, it is nearly 
impossible for constitutional values to penetrate the network that operates 
under its own ‘constitution’. A private business network like Nokia operates 
according to its corporate ethics, internal professional standards, codes. These 
codes, or the communication community that exists on the basis of shared 
codes, keep the network together (see for example the strictly censorial and 
privacy disregarding private internet system). Many scholars are inclined to 
believe that such private ordering that follows market logic makes the efforts 
of state centered constitutional law irrelevant as the constitutional law is 
unable to penetrate the private constitutions. 
 While the above mentioned transboundary ownership networks slip out of 
the territorially and personally organized constitutional supervision, the trans-
governmental networks directly challenge the state. These transgovernmental 
networks take away traditional governmental functions and overwrite/replace 
the decisions of the state organs. The taking of state functions includes regulation, 
adjudication, enforcement, material and other services. The transgovernmental 
networks are often based on public-private partnership with private actors 
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having the decisive say in the network.4 (It should be added that in the process 
of reshaping the public-private divide hybrid organizations are created and 
this poses problems to public law partly unrelated to networking.)5 In other 
instances the desaggregated national governmental bodies operate under the 
umbrella of international organizations but private actors may also participate 
in the network. The distinction is a matter of degree and the composition of the 
networks changes with increased private participation. A typical process in the 
making of the transgovernmental network is that first a traditional international 
organization is created that has decision-making powers under its constitutive 
treaty only with the consent of the participating states represented by govern-
mental agents of the executive power acting on behalf of the sovereign state. 
Decisions are taken by state representatives perhaps on the basis of the prepara-
tory work of an international secretariat. Any amendment to the constitutive 
treaty requires unanimity, in full respect of national sovereignty. Substantive 
decisions, however, are generally not made by the state representatives: in the 
specialized organizations it is the national professional bureaucracy that 
participates in the preparatory work. Here we notice the beginnings of trans-
governmental networking. The professional bureaucrats of the state partici-
pating at the preparatory and decision-making sessions are contacting their peers 
in the other countries; their partners are not anymore their domestic superiors, 
other organs of their state, and even less the constitutional bodies that are 
supposed to control the professional bureaucracy. Perhaps the comitology system 
of the European Union is the best example of this trend. Here the national 
professional bureaucracies are appointing national members to subcommittees 
ad hoc or permanent mandate. The subcommittees very often create additional 
sub-sub committees where national members are appointed in their personal, 
private capacity. The national professional authority has no power to control the 
private experts who sit in the sub-sub committees (where most of the professional 
and policy-implementing work takes place). Moreover, international organi-
zations, at least at the level of operative subcommittees increasingly invite 
private parties with full participatory rights in the deliberation. The International 
  
 4 Aman, A. C. Jr.: Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for a New Administrative 
Law. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 10 (2003) 109–137, 125. 
 5 The divide is crucial as the “private” restricts the applicability of constitutional 
principles. Turning a sphere ‘private’ used to be a privilege of the public power. Obviously 
the transgovernmental networking and other phenomena of globalization radically curtail 
that power. For the consequences of the shift from public to private in terms of constitu-
tional rights see e.g. Oliver, D.: The Frontiers of the State: Public Authorities and Public 
Functions under the Human Rights Act. Public Law 476 (2000) 481–486. 
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Telecommunications Union has panels where global telecommunication 
companies are present, and also provide expertise to governmental actors who 
lack sufficient expertise. In the case of the Basel Committee experts are provided 
by major banks, etc. Human rights intergovernmental organizations admit 
human rights NGOs to their decision-making bodies (which are often composed 
of government appointed but independent private experts). Of course, in all 
these cases the selection of the network participants follows its own, non-
transparent and biased logic. Quite often the sub-sub-committees composed of 
independent experts are acting in their own capacity and not under the 
authority that is delegated to them by the national authority or the sub-
committee for whom they are supposed to work (see in particular the Codex 
Alimentarius food safety decisions.) 
 The decisions and actions of these transnational networks raise constitutional 
issues. The decisions deprive constitutionally designated actors of their power 
to take sovereign decisions, even if the decision applicable in a given country 
formally originates from the constitutionally designated organ. The actions of 
the networks are beyond the control of the constitutionally designated authorities 
and follow principles, which are unrelated to the otherwise pertinent consti-
tutional principles.  
 From a constitutional perspective the following constitutional questions 
emerge in relation to the above developments: Are these decisions legitimate? 
In particular, do they satisfy expectations of democratic participation, or 
democratic deliberation? If not so, do they offer alternative legitimation? Does 
this alternative legitimacy fit into traditional constitutional theory? In case the 
legitimation is incompatible with constitutional values does it make sense to 
talk about constitutionalism in a transnational, networks-operated world? After 
all, it is not evident that traditional constitutional values (rule of law, fairness, 
participatory decision-making, judicial review, political accountability, etc) 
are applicable to, or make sense in regard to transnational networks. If the 
operations of transnational networks present a challenge to constitutionalism, are 
there new devices to counter these trends? Is it possible to devise constitutional 
or international law schemes that will counter these trends providing for fairness, 
accountability, responsiveness in the use of public power increasingly dominated 
by transnational networks? Is such design feasible in an increasingly globalized 
world that, for reasons of efficiency, seems to favor increased networking?  
 Supranational and international organizations work under the assumption 
of state sovereignty. Even in the European Union the states are the masters of 
the Treaty. A sovereign state is generally taking into consideration the decisions 
adopted by the international organizations, but such decisions are in principle 
preconditioned on the consent of the sovereign state. Such consent as well as 
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the disregard of the international decision follow constitutionally determined 
patterns and values. The decisions or co-decisions are taken by constitutionally 
authorized domestic agents who are under constitutional and democratic 
control (at least at the black letter level). The development of the last twenty 
years shows that in the process of globalization governance is becoming more 
and more prominent to the detriment of government.6 It is one of the char-
acteristics of governance that instead of politically accountable government 
agencies private actors (including NGOs) exercise public authority, or at least 
have decisive influence on public determination.  
 The erosion (“hollowing out”) of the sovereignty conscious state has its 
domestic foundations that, at least originally, were unrelated to globalization. 
As Karl-Heinz Ladeur has pointed out, the erosion of the nation state had to do 
with changes in the production processes and commercial dealings and were 
related to scientific uncertainty. Decision-making becomes a cooperative 
process. Norms are not prepackaged knowledge but a matter to be negotiated.7 
Private organizations may live in symbiosis with public entities or public 
entities are privatized. Whichever be the case private entities become the norm 
generators. The privately generated norms not only encompass spheres of life 
that otherwise might be public but are capable to impose their internal norms 
on those who enter into contact with the norm-generating entity. Further, the 
private codes become standards for the state regulators who quite often simply 
underwrite what was developed privately or even delegate authority to private 
code makers. Government as a transparent form of social control that it subject 
to political supervision and control in a democracy has little control over 
governance, including governance that occurs with the participation of public 
administration. At least this is the assumption of governance theorists, while 
the constitutional lawyer is little interested in these developments. For the 
constitutional lawyer the working hypothesis is that whatever is politically 
relevant for the public good is/shall be conceptually embraced in constitutional 
  
 6 For an early recognition in the international context see some essays in James N. 
Rosenau, J. N.–Czempiel, E.-O. (eds.): Governance without Government: Order and 
Change in World Politics. Cambridge, 1992. See further Rhodes, R. A. W.: The New 
Governance: Governing without Government. Political Studies 44 (1996) 662–667. for a 
review of different meanings of governance. One of the definions that are in use reads: 
“Governance is about managing networks” at 658. In this article governance is primarily 
management by networks. Rhodes also points to the hollowing out of the state as the source 
of (domestic networks) governance. The hollowing out of the state results in reduced 
control over implementation. 
 7 Cf. Ladeur, K. H.: Towards a Legal Theory of Supranationality–The Viability of the 
Network Concept. European Law Journal. 3 (1997) 33–54. at 34. 
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law. The background assumption is that in a modern democracy only a 
constitutionally viable policy is capable of long term political existence. 
 Governance exists in many forms. Increasingly governance is the result of 
(regulatory) networks. A closely related form of governance is the neo-corporatist 
one. Neo-corporatist governance is highly problematic for democratic constitu-
tionalism. Neo-corporatist governance structures, like tripartite labor govern-
ance dealing with wage setting is often legally formalized. Governments may 
have important role in setting up such schemes and it is government regulation 
that determines the formal role for the participating parties. 
 The new development that makes governance networks so problematic for 
constitutional government is that by joining transnational networks domestic 
actors escape even the theoretical possibility of government control. Govern-
ance networks increasingly shape themselves and operate in the vacuum of the 
international setting where the sovereign nation state has limited access. 
 It is in this regard that the most visible leak to constitutional arrangements 
is noticeable. Independent national regulatory agencies, and to a lesser extent 
other non-political government branches like courts, have created their own 
networks with different degrees of competence. The forum that originally might 
have served simply as a venue for the exchange of ideas (‘co-operation 
tourism’) rapidly develops into a point of reference and authority. The network 
operates as international pressure group supporting its members against other 
branches of domestic power. At a next stage these networks will provide 
expertise to international organizations in charge of providing harmonized 
regulatory schemes, international law, or other cooperation. Finally, the net-
work of independent agencies becomes a self-relying, recognized body that 
imposes its will on the participating states, and at the same time exempts the 
national regulator from state control in the sense that policies, professional 
standards, including conditions of work, and even dismissals are dependent 
upon the network and not on the political branches that are supposed to exercise 
a level of control that is compatible with the independence of the agency. In 
other words, the independent agencies through their network membership 
develop a new transnational network identity and change their point of reference 
from a national one to an international professional one.  
 The independent telecommunications regulatory agencies of the member 
states of the European Union offer a telling example of the process. In a number 
of EU member states there were no independent regulators. Traditionally 
telecommunications was an area of governmental regulation carried out partly in 
a ministerial department and partly by the Post Service that was a government 
service. It was only under the pressure of the EU directives that some member 
states abandoned this model. Interestingly the concerned ministerial departments 
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and postal services were resistant to this change that was the result of the 
decision of the political branch, i.e. the executive that did not share the 
institutional interests of its telecommunications bureaucracy and was ready to 
accept business pressure and general deregulatory ideology. However, shortly 
after the reorganization took place the independent regulatory agencies have 
created their informal network and started to coordinate their policies in order 
to come up with a unified professional position. This was more than welcome 
from Brussels as it offered a regulatory relief to the Commission generalists. 
The Commission readily accepted that the still informal network of the tele-
communications regulators will take the initiative (in collaboration with 
industry that had its equivalent networks) in European telecommunications 
policy setting. As a result, the formation of telecommunications policy shifted 
from the national political executive to the national regulators, but not in their 
national agency capacity, but in their capacity of network members. Hence the 
policy was created as a network policy. The national regulatory agency became 
able to formulate its policies against its own national government relying on 
the network and claiming that the national government has no authority to 
intervene in the policy that was developed as an all-European policy. The 
European telecommunications policy is primarily developed by the network, 
and the Commission’s role is primarily to transpose that policy into directives. 
In 2002 the new telecommunications directives further increased the national 
power of the national regulatory agency: the initiative came from the network 
members and served their interests vis a vis the national governments. The 
directives granted additional powers to the network within the Union vis a vis 
the political institutions of the Union. One may wonder how and why the 
national governments accepted such reduction of their constitutional power. 
They were advised to do so by their independent expert agencies, which had 
the strong self-interest in the emerging solution against the weak interest of 
other domestic players–all that in accordance with the logic of collective 
action. The new directives recognize the formal policy-making powers of the 
regulatory network.  
 The emergence of transgovernmental regulatory networks that desaggregate 
the state are the continuation of a trend related to the emergence of neutral 
institutions. I am not claiming that transgovernmental networking is primarily 
among neutral institutions. In fact we notice transgovernmental networking 
amongst all regulatory agencies. However, state desaggregation means that the 
regulatory agencies and public administration in general is becoming less and 
less dependent on the political branches, moreover this is legitimized. Regulators 
increasingly construe themselves (are designed as) neutral institutions in the 
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last thirty years.8 Neutral institutions always had their constitutional problems, 
as the whole idea to have neutral institutions reflects mistrust in democratic 
politics and is also poses a challenge to traditional concepts of checks and 
balances as understood in a tripartite division of powers.  
 The modern state (as a network of organizations) pretends to be non-partisan 
or neutral in an increasing number of instances. Institutional arrangements are 
developed to make that claim credible.  
 The modern state is identified not only with representative institutions but 
also with administrative structures operated as public bureaucracies.9 Public 
bureaucracies offer a degree of neutrality in the sense of not necessarily being 
politically partisan. However, the depoliticization of public administration 
remains incomplete. The social desire for a non-partisan state machinery can 
not be entirely satisfied through the establishment of a civil service. Rather, in 
order to further isolate some parts of the civil service from partisan politics, 
neutral regulatory institutions emerged early in the 20th century. (See the creation 
of federal and state agencies to regulate railroads and public utilities in the 
United States.) In complex societies, many traditional governmental functions 
were transferred to independent organizations, which were legitimated in terms 
of their professional expertise.10 In principle, these neutral institutions are to a 
  
 8 See the increasing number of independent regulators in utilities, media, banking, 
health etc. that are designed to operate in isolation from daily partisan politics. 
 9 Impartial institutions (like courts, and constitutional courts in particular) also contribute 
to the neutralization of the state. Contrary to institutions like independent agencies, courts 
stand above identifiable contests. They are impartial in the sense that they don’t follow 
independent professional policy goals other than that related to self-preservation. See Sajó 
A.: The Concepts of Neutrality and the State. In: Dworkin, R. et al. (eds.): From Liberal 
Values to Democratic Transition. New York–Budapest, 2003. 107–144. 
 U. S. independent agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission, were originally 
designed to be exempt from executive control. See Humphrey’s Executor v. U.S. 295 U.S. 
602 (1935). This understanding differs markedly from the one voiced by the Council of 
Europe (below), which denies legislative oversight. Note further that the characterization 
of agencies as “executive” or “independent” is the result of ad hoc political decisions. 
Strauss, P. L.: The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth 
Branch. Columbia Law Review 84 (1984) 573–669. 
 10 Broadcasting regulation by independent regulatory agencies exemplifies a relatively 
recent world-wide attempt to neutralize oversight of the communicative sphere. Here, 
various institutional solutions guarantee the independence of the regulated media and the 
neutral handling of broadcasting-related matters. This is done “officially” in order to avoid 
politicization or because the public interest cannot be served well in a partisan manner. The 
contemporary solutions range from quasi self-regulation by those concerned to regulation 
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great extent autonomous and independent of political bodies or democratic 
politics. The analysis of the actual institutions indicates how limited such 
independence and autonomy actually was. Nevertheless, they often have enough 
autonomy to remain independent from the political branches if they really 
wish to do so. Autonomous bodies may be biased but, in principle, are beyond 
partisan politics and, therefore, their rule-making and decisions are deemed to 
be neutral in the sense of non-political. This trend is rooted in the growth of 
independent expert bodies. Neutralization relies on a specific form of authority 
derived from the professionalism and expertise enabled by neutral institutional 
settings. 
 The transfer of decision-making to neutral public institutions remains 
problematic. Policy-making institutions that are insulated from the democratic 
process are not necessarily fully neutralized in the sense of being exempt from 
political influence, but, at least, they are insulated vis-a-vis the democratic 
process. Of course, such insulation may also allow elected officials, government 
bureaucracies and interest groups to exercise even more political influence 
than in a transparent democratic setting. Neutralization has very often been a 
way to protect particular groups by excluding contrary political influences. 
The design of insulated public institutions is, after all, left overwhelmingly to 
legislation that often follows a logic completely alien to institutional neutrality. 
The withdrawal of the state from certain public domains is often determined by 
major performance failures accompanied by successful resistance to govern-
ment by the regulated. Quite often politicians seek to avoid responsibility, and 
independent agencies allow politicians to avoid responsibility. Note that most 
of the independent state agencies which were created to enhance credibility 
serve special interest groups and only indirectly the general public: it is the 
trust of these special interests that is at stake. (Central banks directly serve the 
financial community; the media regulatory agency is catering to broadcasters, 
etc.). The constitutional problem with transgovernmental networks of neutral 
institutions is that these problematic features become even more acute. 
 Even where professionalism prevails, neutrality may suffer from insularity. 
If insularity means non-interference it may result in a lack of social res-
ponsiveness. If the performance of the neutral institution follows the dictates 
of the internal self-interest of the organization, it will undermine trust in the 
institution, notwithstanding the formal fairness of its procedures. Moreover, 
these institutions tend to keep their decision-making process non-transparent. 
                                                      
by non-governmental bodies as decision-makers, and to insulated independent govern-
mental bodies. 
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 What are the implications of these trends to the prevailing constitutional 
arrangement? The national executive power must reckon with the operations 
of transgovernmental networks, including the possibility of additional, non-
government induced privatization and also with further desaggregation of the 
state in the sense that national governmental entities, and independent agencies 
and other elements of the ‘neutral power’ turn against the executive and 
become unreachable for the other branches. It follows that decisions that affect 
the general public are not generated in the public sphere as it is assumed in 
constitutional law. Given that governance follows from transgovernmental 
policies, it is highly questionable to what extent the legality of such measures 
can be controlled by organs of supervision. Beyond the problem resulting from 
the desaggregation of the state, private systems cause additional problems 
for constitutionalism. The social sphere of the constitutionally controlled is 
shrinking. It is not any more up to constitutional law to determine what pertains 
to the public domain, and, consequently what is subject to constitutional values. 
The problem is aggravated by practical difficulties: the shrinking state simply 
has no resources to patrol the vast territories of the private. The pluralism of 
the legal system undermines law itself. 
 National Parliaments loose legislative and supervisory powers. The executive 
gets new opportunities to bypass legislation by allowing transgovernmental 
networks to come up with legislative solutions. Legislation becomes less trans-
parent. On the other hand the executive that creates opportunities to present its 
own politically unacceptable dreams as international dictates of expert 
compromise, looses control over its own professional bureaucracies. Finally, at 
least in Europe, the national administration of justice is loosing ground to 
international courts.11 These international courts operate in a network with 
the national courts (undermining to some extent the traditional hierarchical 
structure of the domestic system) creating a form of transnational cooperative 
constitutionalism.  
 Obviously, network governance is not the end of politics in the sense that 
neutral institutions still enable domination that remains the goal and result of 
political games. One should keep in mind the advantages of transgovernmental 
networks before condemning the inevitable. After all, irrespective of deontolo-
gical considerations that echo liberal constitutionalism, independent agencies, 
  
 11 This is quite problematic for the sovereignty concerned, but not necessarily for the 
constitutionalism concerned, as the international courts, which are relieved of local political 
considerations and loyalties of the national courts, seem to contribute to constitutionalism, 
and national administration of justice to the extent it has to cooperate with the international 
instances seems to be liberated of parochial interests. 
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both at national and Union levels were created not only because of the 
advantages the regulatory network systems offered to interest groups politics. 
These professional, beyond-the-reach of-ordinary-politics networks are also 
devices of quasi-constitutional pre-commitment.12 Such pre-commitments are 
crucial for the stability and sustainability of any constitutional system, 
particularly in democracies, where democracy, as Juan Linz has often stated, is 
about the non-perpetuation of the regime. Without such arm’s length operating 
agencies the democratic welfare redistribution would have become unsustainable. 
Democratic politics is too responsive to short term constituency interests 
pushing the responsive welfare state to unsustainable largesse. It was for such 
reasons that regulation through independent agencies (and in a way the whole 
concept of neutral powers) emerged.13 Independent agencies protect established 
interest groups against newcomers who would use parties through parliament 
and the executive; and protect these established interests against politically 
induced redistributive policies. The autonomous independent regulatory agencies 
are created in the name of the needs of the socio-economic regime (or the whole 
polity) to protect the regime against its own self-destructive mechanisms. The 
independent central bank is built to resist the welfarist inflationary policies of 
elected governments, etc. 
  
 12 Moravcsik and Majone argue that states accept transfer of their power to networks as 
an act of irrevocable precommitment. 
 13 For a study of the constitutional relevance of independent agencies and their 
networking, Sajó: op. cit.; Sajó A.: Neutral Institutions: Implications for Government 
Trustworthiness in East European Democracies. In: Kornai J.–Rose-Ackerman, S. (eds.): 
Building a Trustworthy State in Post-Socialist Transition. New York, 2004.; on networking 
in international relations Slaughter, A.-M.: Global Government Networks, Global 
Information Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy. Michigan Journal of International 
Law 24 (2003) 1041–1075; on European networks Dehousse, R.: Regulation by Networks 
in the European Community: the Role of European Agencies. Journal of European Public 
Policy (1997) 246–261. In 2002 Majone found that although political compromise resulted 
in institutional designs with ambiguous responsibilities and uncertain competencies, “the 
issue of independent and credible European agencies is still very much alive”. Majone, G.: 
Functional Interests: European Agencies. In: Peterson, J.–Shackleton, M. (eds.): The 
Institutions of the European Union. Oxford, 2002. 322.  
 Any discussion of democratic accountability in the network age should start from 
Slaughter’s warning: “the impossibility of fully “reaggregating” the state in a tidy 
democratic package will ultimately require a much more sophisticated understanding of 
networks and the interaction of nodes in a network with each other, whether individual or 
institutional.” op. cit. 1068. 
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 Beyond their contribution to pre-commitment, the relative success of net-
works14 may also indicate that traditional values represented in constitutionalism 
do not represent any more the shared political values of the community. Alter-
natively, the nation-state as a political community is loosing its attractiveness 
as people turn to communities that are offered by virtual and actual networks. 
Perhaps the efficiency based credibility of the network is more attractive 
than the norms and values of constitutionalism. After all, transgovernmental 
networks are more successful in knowledge management than traditional state 
bureaucracies. Besides “as public policy becomes increasingly influenced by 
global conditions, formal policy-making institutions – national legislatures, 
government agencies, and multilateral institutions, among others – often lack 
the scope, speed, and contacts to acquire and use crucial information needed to 
formulate effective policy.”15  
 Constitutions are understood as taking “stock of the values that comprise 
the preferred forms of life of a given community (and are compatible with 
universal constitutional values).”16 But perhaps the values with universal 
aspirations are not the preferred set for people inhabiting the networks. Instead 
of the normative validity based on value legitimacy there is a trend towards 
efficiency/interest maximization as a source of legitimacy: in this regard 
traditional rule of law bound constitutional solutions cannot compete with what 
the professional networks promise to achieve. Or, perhaps, global networks are 
successful because states cannot match the normative expectations of their own 
professed constitutionalism.17 Perhaps the sovereign state is not the democratic 
  
 14 Once again, transgovernmental networks emerge only in case there is a fundamental 
epistemic agreement among the participants and even in this case the network might run 
into the successful resistance of the nation-state. For an example of lack of value agree-
ment and consequently little networking in the context of European privacy regulators, 
see Francesca Bignami, Transgovernmental Networks vs. Democracy: The Case of the 
European Information Privacy Network, Michigan Journal of International Law 26 (2005) 
807–868. 
 15 Reinecke, W. H.: The Other World Wide Web: Global Policy Networks. Foreign 
Policy (1999–2000) 44–57. 45. For a recent critique of the deliberation within professional 
networks see Shapiro, M.: “Deliberative,” “Independent” Technocracy v. Democratic 
Politics: Will the Globe Echo the E. U.? IILJ Working Paper 2004/5. Global Administrative 
Law Series. New York University Law School. 
 16 Closa, C.: Deliberative Constitutional Politics and the Turn Towards a Norms-Based 
Legitimacy of the EU Constitution. European Law Journal 11 (2005) 411–431. at 419. 
 17 On the performance deficit of constitutionalism see Grimm, D.: Die Zukunft der 
Verfassung. In: Preuss, U. K. (ed.): Zum Begriff der Verfassung. Frankfurt, 1994. 227. 
224 ANDRÁS SAJÓ 
  
expression of the political community. Or the political community is simply a 
marriage of convenience. 
 On the other hand it is not necessarily the case that all the above develop-
ments are contrary to values embedded in national constitutions. The network 
‘constitutions’ do not replace or overwrite national constitutions. The content 
of the national constitution, however, changes. (This development is beyond 
the loss of relevance problem). The transgovernmental norms represent a 
different logic, mostly that of expert knowledge that disregards rule of law 
logic and follows efficiency considerations dictated by the bounded rationality 
of the professions. International courts, on the other hand, emphasize values 
that are perhaps not alien to constitutional values but have different accents.18 
Once again, I have to emphasize that the transgovernmental networks effect 
is countered in many instances. Network power is a function of the existing 
power of the nation state (i.e. it could not happen if the states were able 
to/interested in stopping these developments). It is not by accident that the 
Supreme Court of the United States is committed to a defense of the national 
constitution against internationalization.19 But smaller, weaker states are/have 
to be more opportunistic. At least neo-realists suggest that a weak state would 
sign to the internationally developed normative expectations to ensure its 
existence (bandwagoning).20 
 Are these developments lamentable from a constitutionalist perspective? 
Certainly the lack of accountability and the democratic deficit (that cannot be 
undone by deliberative democracy of the select and invited network participants 
and token representatives of “society”) makes one very unconfortable. Trans-
governmental networks are even less concerned about human rights than 
judicially controlled traditional executice bureaucracies were.21 After all, the 
democratic ideal requires “that politically responsible institutions should 
determine the direction of government policy.”22  
  
 18 See the tensions between the ECJ and national courts in matters of rule of law, where 
the ECJ is primarily concerned with the efficient application of a harmonized European legal 
system and is ready to read the requirements of the rule of law in that context. See Alcan. 
 19 For a systematic attack on globalism from an Americanist perspective see John 
Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously? Chicago Journal of International 
Law 1 (2000) 205. 
 20 Walt, S. M.: Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning. In: Art R.–Jervis, R. (eds.): 
International Politics. New York, 1992. 71. 
 21 Bignami: op. cit. offers an empirical example: The administrative practice of the 
European privacy network… alters substantially the rights calculus. 810. 
 22 Sandalow, T.: Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and 
the Judicial Role. University of Chicago Law Review 42 (1975) 653–704, 695 and 700. 
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 This is not to exclude the possibility of the evolution of a new constitu-
tionalism that reflects network based operations. After all, transgovernmental 
networks prevent the concentration of power: in that regard they have a strong 
constitutional potential in times of cabinet dictatorship. Networks are by 
definition pluricentric. However, so far there is very little in the network world 
that would point towards the affirmation of traditional constitutional values of 
freedom. Moreover, professional considerations in networks make conflict of 
interest and rule of law considerations irrelevant or even unacceptable.  
 To end on an optimistic note: the network phenomena “are rooted in the 
information-technology revolution ... that simultaneously empowers individuals 
and groups [while] diminish[ing] traditional authority.”23 To the extent the 
empowerment element will prevail the concern with freedom will resurface. 
Although the transgovernmental networks raise issues of democratic deficit, 
it is not out of question that networks themselves will offer legitimate alternatives 
to the constitutionally and democratically problematic official government 
structure of the nation state. After all, there are important arguments in favor of 
transgovernmental networks: “the transgovernmental cooperation is a significant 
development in international law, but it is likely to bolster liberal inter-
nationalism as much–or more–than it will undermine or displace it.”24 Perhaps, 
alternative forms of control (supervision) and self-referential accountability 
might ease the challenge that traditional constitutional structures could not 
handle so far. After all, as Majone has pointed out, the credibility of the 
members of the network depends on each other’s reputation, hence they will 
monitor each other–are in a way accountable to each other.25 Besides, there are 
a number of forms of accountability that are not based on the political 
process.26 These elements point to a socially acceptable transgovernmental 
governance that will not rely on constitutionalism. 
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 24 Raustiala, op. cit.  
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 26 See Keohane, R. O.: Governance in a Partially Globalized World. American Political 
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